**

**SMA Reach-back**

**Question (LR 3):** What actions and polices can regional and coalition nations employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL inspired fighters?

**Executive Summary**

The three contributors to this quick look agreed that there are two general paths that must be addressed when working to reduce the recruitment of ISIL-inspired fighters: 1) reduce the influence of returning foreign fighters and 2) prevent radicalization at the community level before individuals become receptive to extremist messaging.

Governments are perhaps best suited to addressing the first source of inspiration for those vulnerable to extremism: reducing the influence of returning foreign fighters. Kim Cragin, NDU, noted that many of the successful, ISIL-inspired attacks we have seen in the West involved a returning foreign fighter or two at its core. These individuals lend expertise, training, morale, and indoctrination. There are several ways of mitigating this threat that nations can take:

1. make it illegal to travel overseas to fight as part of an insurgency (Cragin);
2. provide off-ramps for non-violent returning ISIL supporters (Cragin, see also Ligon & Spitaletta); and
3. imprison returnees who engaged in violent acts (Cragin, see also Ligon & Spitaletta).

The second strategy to reduce the recruitment of ISIL-inspired fighters is to prevent individuals from becoming susceptible to radicalization in the first place (Cragin). This is difficult for a number of reasons. First, there is some consensus that counter-radicalization is best address by those at the community level (by religious leaders, families, teachers, etc.) (Cragin, Braddock). Second, radicalization is often is highly individualized process; there is little agreement about the factors that lead an individual to radicalize (Cragin). So given these limitations, what actions can governments take at the national level to reduce the susceptibility of the population to radicalization?

1. Implement programs to reinforce non-radicalization by addressing some of the structural problems that are most often considered sources of grievance for the population at risk including poor education, unemployment, discrimination, etc. (Cragin)
2. Encourage individuals to reject violent extremism (Cragin). In a sense, returning foreign fighters present a unique and powerful opportunity for the coalition’s countermessaging campaign (Braddock). These individuals have the credibility and trust needed to speak persuasively about ISIL’s lies, violence, and crimes to susceptible populations.
3. Study the drivers of radicalization as well as why most individuals do not embrace extremism (Cragin)
4. Closely monitor mosque sermons and religious publications (Abbas)

Conclusion: Policies to reduce the recruitment of ISIL inspired fighters must go beyond de-radicalization and countermessaging programs; nations must also strengthen the factors in their own countries that inhibit radicalization (Cragin). These policies and strategies must be implemented immediately to mitigate the ability of returnees to inspire violence.

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***Editor****: Sarah Canna (NSI)*

**SME Input**

**Response to Literature Review 3**

**Dr. Hassan Abbas**

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What actions and policies can regional and coalition nations employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL inspired fighters?

*ANSWER: By closely watching and monitoring mosque sermons and religious publications, especially those funded and sponsored by Saudi Arabia.*

**Response to Literature Review 3**

**Dr. Kurt Braddock**

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Penn State University

**What actions and policies can regional and coalition nations employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL-inspired fighters?**

Much of what I have said above[[1]](#footnote-1) applies to this question as well: using local partners, masking message sources when the source is likely to be perceived as untrustworthy, etc. However, I believe there is one area where regional and coalition nations can use the power of counter-narratives to great effect in reducing the recruitment of ISIL-inspired fighters.

Recall that I said that message sources perceived as trustworthy (or are otherwise authorities on ISIL-related experiences) are likely to be believed. Given this, I think there is a huge opportunity to recruit and utilize fighters who have defected from ISIL or have fled ISIL territory to tell stories about the group’s crimes and lies, as well as the awful experiences they have had. To be sure, individuals who travel to ISIL territory to fight for the group should be punished accordingly. However, individuals who defect or leave the group voluntarily can make VERY persuasive sources of counter-narratives intended to undermine the dominant narratives that ISIL seeks to spread: Muslim utopia, fighters treated well, etc. These defecting fighters are likely to be perceived as authorities on the topic, and moreover, are likely to be culturally, racially, and religiously similar to those that the USG seeks to dissuade. This makes them powerful potential partners in counter-ISIL messaging efforts.

**Reducing ISIL Recruitment**

**Dr. R. Kim Cragin**

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This paper addresses the issue of ISIL recruitment from Literature Review Question #3. To do this, it utilizes a “quick look” format and focuses on two non-standard ideas approaches to challenge of terrorist recruitment. For readers interested in source materials on this subject, this paper also incorporates a bibliography at the end of the document.

**Minimize the impact of existing foreign fighters and returnees[[2]](#footnote-2)**

The single most significant policy that nations could employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL fighters in the future is to minimize the influence of returnees. Historically, most foreign fighters have returned home from conflicts overseas to recruit and build local networks. Take, for example, the case of Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. Approximately 80 per cent of the 20,000 foreign fighters returned home and recidivism rates ranged from 40 per cent (Indonesia) to 90 per cent (Algeria). Moreover, even in the case of Indonesia, which had the lowest rate of recidivism, returnees recruited and expanded local terrorist networks. In fact, recent interviews in Indonesia with Afghan veterans revealed that foreign fighters were instructed to recruit 10 new operatives each, once they got home.

A similar pattern exists with foreign fighters today. Between June 2014 and May 2016 there were 54 directed and “inspired” plots or attacks associated with ISIL in Europe. Foreign fighter returnees were involved in 65 per cent of the directed and 40 per cent of the entirety of the plots. In many of the plots, returnees recruited others to assist in the operation. The November 2015 Paris attacks illustrate this phenomenon. Of the 16 individuals directly involved in the operation, 9 were foreign fighters, two were Iraqis sent to assist with the operation and the rest were recruited locally.

This means that regional and coalition nations should put policies and programs into place now to mitigate the impact of existing foreign fighters and returnees on future recruits. These programs should include the following elements. First, nations should make it illegal – through penal codes or otherwise – to travel overseas to fight as part of an insurgency. The United Nations has already begun to work with countries on their legal frameworks, but this framework is essential for countries to be able to act, and assist each other, in mitigating the impact of returnees. Second, countries should provide “off-ramps” or de-radicalization programs to individuals who travelled to Syria in support of ISIL, but did not engage in violence. Third, returnees who engaged in violent acts should be imprisoned – per a countries’ relevant penal code – but, in the prison, they should likewise be placed into a de-radicalization program. If they refuse to participate, they should be isolated from other prisoners to minimize the potential recruitment of other prisoners.

**Emphasize programs that reinforce non-radicalization[[3]](#footnote-3)**

Another policy that nations could employ to reduce recruitment of ISIL fighters in the future is to implement programs that reinforce non-radicalization. Generally speaking, radicalization can be understood as a process whereby individuals are persuaded that violent activity is justified in pursuit of some political aim, and then they decide to become involved in that violence. However, many of the factors that push or pull individuals toward radicalization are in dispute within the expert community. Much of the problem is that the factors identified by experts as contributing to radicalization apply to many more people than those who eventually become involved in political violence. Such limitations are more than academic, because they make it difficult for policymakers to design interventions. These limitations lead to programs aimed at manipulating broad structural actors—for example, education—so that they affect small subsets of populations of people who might or might not decide to become terrorists. One alternative is to instead focus policies on encouraging individuals to reject violent extremism.

To explore this possibility, we conducted a series of subject matter interviews, focus groups, and surveys in the Palestinian West Bank (2012) and Yemen (2016) on why individuals eschew violent extremism. Findings revealed the following:

* Rejecting violent extremism is a progress with multiple stages and choices within each stage
* Choosing not to engage in violence is distinct from opposing political violence in theory
* Nonviolent political activism does not contribute to non-radicalization
* Family plays a greater role than friends in shaping attitudes towards nonviolence in the Palestinian West Bank, and
* Urban centers in Yemen represent key populations for strengthening non-radicalization.

These findings suggest that policies to reduce the recruitment of ISIL inspired fighters must go beyond de-radicalization and counter messaging programs. In fact, from a policy perspective it is equally or more important to strengthen the factors that inhibit radicalization. And, importantly, these factors are *not* merely the absence of radicalization factors. Thus regional and coalition nations should attempt to understand why most do not engage in violence in their countries and they attempt to design programs to reinforce these factors.

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# Off-Ramps for Da’esh Leadership: Preventing Da’esh 2.0[[4]](#footnote-4)

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We have argued that Da’esh is comprised of leaders with heterogeneous talents and motivations (Ligon, 2014; Ligon & Derrick, 2015; Derrick et al., in press). Upon examining the Da’esh leadership team (both formal and informal leaders) for past seven years, we have identified that they have a more heterogeneous Top Management Team (TMT) than other VEOs, particularly than their peers in the Global Jihad Industry[[5]](#footnote-5). To date, these differences have been either overlooked or seen as a strength[[6]](#footnote-6). However, in conventional TMTs, we often see such heterogeneity leads to significant barriers to collaboration[[7]](#footnote-7), and these barriers can lead to fissures and seams that can cause decreased decision making, splintering, and other organizational tensions. In short, while a strength of Da’esh is its diverse workforce, in conditions of external pressure and competition, this diversity can also result in tremendous barriers to collaboration. In addition, they also require tailored approaches when deciding what to do with these leaders to prevent them from creating Da’esh 2.0 or taking their talents elsewhere. Precision is a necessary component for effective influence and segmenting Da’esh’s TMT allows for more personalized lines of persuasion[[8]](#footnote-8) based on typologies. Thus, the focus of this chapter is two-fold. First, we will share the underlying theory of TMT collaboration, and provide practitioners with some tactics to foment barriers and distrust to aid the operations meant to degrade the organization (e.g., retaking of Mosul). Second, given our analysis of what motivated each of these leaders to join and remain in Da’esh, we will provide a set of tailored off-ramps to be considered to deter captured leaders from reconstituting Da’esh 2.0.

#### Capitalizing on Operations: Fomenting Barriers to Collaboration among Leaders

In combination with the remarkable kinetic operations to retake key territory such as Mosul, influence operations should foment **Distrust** within the Top Management Team. Using social identity theory, social dominance theory, and information processing theories, there are typically three types of subgroups in organizations: 1) Identity-Based Subgroups 2) Resource Based Subgroups 3) Knowledge-Based Subgroups[[9]](#footnote-9). Da’esh TMT has identifiable subgroups based on *all three* of these drivers. Analysis of the targets (i.e., message, receivers) for the three subgroups/Da’esh leader typologies (i.e., Violent Seekers, True Ideologues, and Pragmatics) follows on subsequent pages. Messaging to each of these groups should take into account their decision-making style (and errors/biases), organizational functions, life history, psychological characteristics, network, influence levers[[10]](#footnote-10)

Mayer’s model[[11]](#footnote-11) of trust among leaders is based on TMT members perceiving each other’s 1) **Ability** (expertise source), 2) **Benevolence** (to each other and external “in-group actors”), and 3) **Integrity**. One way to foment distrust and cause a barrier to effective collaboration (e.g., C2, decision making) is to erode perceptions among the TMT of each other’s ability, benevolence, and/or integrity. Thus, messaging should have these goals to accelerate fissures and barriers to collaboration among the three identified leader groups.



Figure : Factors of TMT Trust (Adapted from Mayer et al., 1995)

#### Analysis of the Target (i.e., Message, Receiver): Da’esh Leader Typologies[[12]](#footnote-12):

True Ideologues:

**Decision Making:** Focus on ideological goals in decision making (e.g., return to past levels of greatness, use of negative mental models/past experiences with failure to inform on lessons learned and mistakes to avoid (thus, historical references valued), use of symbolic imagery and rituals in communications.

1. **Likely Cognitive Errors:** low integrative complexity, black and white thinking, lack of flexibility, can overly attend to potential negative consequences.
2. **Likely Organizational Functions:** Sharia Council members at Central or Regional/Province levels; governing wing and administrative functions; high organizational knowledge/expertise.
3. **Biodata/Life History:** Highly educated, strong understanding and identity with tenets of Islam; 10 years or more in formal religious training.
4. **Psychological Characteristics:** Deferent to authority, High Allegiance to ISIL[[13]](#footnote-13); Risk-taking; Patient with new converts and loyal to those with ideological expertise.
5. **Network:** Muftis and Elite Clerics; tangential connections to some former Baathists.
6. **Influence Levers:**
	1. Inspirational Appeal – Emotional requests or proposals that arouse enthusiasm by appealing to Takfiri values and ideals, or by increasing their confidence they can do something well. May be provoked if challenged on their credentials.
	2. Upward Appeal – persuade him that the request is approved by upper leadership, or appeals to upper leadership to gain compliance with request (insinuate approval by individuals they perceive as powerful, expert, or trustworthy.
7. **Factors of Perceived Trustworthiness:**
	1. **Ability** – perceived inspiring cohesion, commitment to cause; expertise in Sharia; seen as the conscience and Spiritual leader.
	2. **Benevolence** – Equitable distribution of ISIL resources to populace, as long as seen as compliant with ISIL.
	3. **Integrity** – Seen as pure and deeply committed to religious ideals.
8. **Message Characteristics:**
	1. **Do:** craft inspirational messages in ideal of Islam and purity. Focus on incongruence of decisions of other subgroups that are in conflict with historical vision of Caliphate.
	2. **Don’t:** attack ideology, don’t have incomplete or weak arguments based on misunderstanding of Islam. Don’t use Apostates to deliver message.
9. **Message Characteristics ABOUT THEM from CREDIBLE SOURCE:**
	1. Attack source of expertise: focus on his hypocrisy.
	2. Focus on lack of data behind decisions (if to Pragmatists)
	3. Focus on lack of penchant for violence (if to Violence Seekers)
	4. Focus on Ideologues’ unwillingness to directly partake in violence (if to Violence Seekers)
	5. Focus on Ideologues’ strategic shift away from Iraq & Syria (if to Violence Seekers)
10. **Message MOEs:**
	1. Questioning pragmatic and violence goals/decisions
	2. Increased Risk-Taking
	3. Weakening loyalty to other leader subgroups
	4. Greater attention to potential negative consequences of action.
	5. Silo communication (lower communication, information sharing with other leaders)

Pragmatics:

1. **Decision Making:** Focus on secular, tangible goals in decision making (e.g., control of government, critical resources, strategic revenue streams such as highly traveled roads); use data and facts to make decisions, rational and incremental progress toward long-term goals. Focus on solving day-to-day problems for organization and people.
2. **Likely Cognitive Errors:** decision paralysis from overly analytical approach; can overly weigh importance of pragmatic goals versus ideological goals, misunderstanding of Violence Seekers rationale for participation..
3. **Likely Organizational Functions:** Shura Council members, military functions (with some rotations to administrative functions – high levels and large span of control).
4. **Biodata/Life History:** Highly educated, typically secular in nature. Some ideological training, but far less than true ideologues. Technical training (e.g., accounting, engineering functions), military training. Many are former Baathists who saw ISIL as a way to regain power.
5. **Psychological Characteristics:** Deferent to authority, Moderate allegiance to ISIL (seen as a way to meet more pragmatic goals); low risk-taking; pragmatic loyalties based on perceived usefulness.
6. **Network:** Baathists; some Yazidis if from Northern Iraq; distrustful of formal government in Iraq.
7. **Influence Levers:**
	1. Rational Appeal – Use logical arguments and factual evidence to persuade him that a proposal or request is viable and likely to result in attainment of task objectives.
	2. Exchange Appeal – Make explicit promises or implicit promises that he will receive rewards or tangible benefits if he complies with a request or supports a proposal, or remind him of a favor to be reciprocated.
8. **Factors of Perceived Trustworthiness:**
	1. **Ability** – perceived as expert problem solvers and planners; often have special technical expertise and training that makes them assets.
	2. **Benevolence** – Lowest of the three characteristics for them; situational kindness (almost always based on pragmatic exchanges) ; reciprocal altruism
	3. **Integrity** – Seen as loyal to the ISIL organization, but may actually view the organization simply as a means to an end.
9. **Message Characteristics:**
	1. **Do:** craft rational messages based on data, facts, and logical arguments. Highlight how ideological goals and violent goals conflict with more data-driven, incremental approaches. Remind them of their education, training in academics. Praise their attention to detail and careful planning. Focus on the future.
	2. **Don’t:** Use ideological or inspirational appeals to influence them. Avoid focusing on past Da’esh atrocities (if possible) as it might present perceived barrier to defection.
10. **Message Characteristics ABOUT THEM from CREDIBLE SOURCE:**
	1. Attack source of expertise: denigrate his planning, technical skills.
	2. Focus on identifiable outgroup characteristics (Baathist, relationship to Yazidis)
	3. Focus on lack of religious conviction (if to Ideologues).
	4. Focus on lack of direct participation in violence (if to Violence Seekers)
11. **Message MOEs:**
	1. Questioning ideological and violence goals/decisions
	2. Slower decision making
	3. Weakening loyalty to ISIL organization and other leader subgroups
	4. Focus on day-to-day short term goals over long-term, strategic goals.

Violent Seekers:

1. **Decision Making:** Focus on adventure seeking, sensation seeking activities; short-term decision-making; escalation of violence and means to punish others.
2. **Likely Cognitive Errors:** Overlook pragmatic and ideological goals of organization in name of increased violence and excitement, Overestimate potential rewards of success/victory and underestimate the risks.
3. **Likely Organizational Functions:** Military or Hisbah if administrative; if from Western country or Tunisia, likely in higher level and greater span of control.
4. **Biodata/Life History:** Variable levels of education, but experience with crime, hunting, or combat. Likely experienced prison or detention early on; problems with authority. Early evidence of thrill seeking. Novice in ideological training.
5. **Psychological Characteristics:** Difficulty following authority unless very brutal, controlling; high risk taking, low allegiance to ISIL as an organization. May appear fervent in commitment, but is likely a recent convert with superficial understanding of Islam. Often seeking a masculine social identify and tend toward behaviors that advertise “maleness”,
6. **Network:** heterogeneous, but made of foreign fighters outside of Iraq and Syria.
7. **Influence Levers:**
	1. Pressure Appeal – use of demands, threats, or intimidation to convince him to comply with a request; responds to assertiveness.
	2. Exchange Appeal – Make explicit promises or implicit promises that he will receive rewards or tangible benefits if he complies with a request or supports a proposal, or remind him of a favor to be reciprocated. Rewards should be tied around thrill-seeking and violence.
8. **Factors of Perceived Trustworthiness:**
	1. **Ability** – perceived as expert fighters; also perceived as knowledgeable about home country (e.g., targets of interest).
	2. **Benevolence** – Lowest of the three characteristics for them; situational kindness (almost always based on opportunity for excitement)
	3. **Integrity** – Seen as committed as they traveled from comfortable home countries to join; but over time, may be seen as imposter/foreigner.
9. **Message Characteristics TO THEM:**
	1. **Do:** craft messages about chance for violence; need to escalate (and other’s slow decision making); do use forceful messengers who have expertise in fighting.
	2. **Don’t:** Use ideological or rational appeals to influence them.
10. **Message Characteristics ABOUT THEM from CREDIBLE SOURCE:**
	1. Attack source of expertise: denigrate his fighting ability.
	2. Focus on identifiable outgroup characteristics (accents, skin color)
	3. Focus on lack of religious conviction and/or intellectual skill.
	4. Highlight the Ideologues and Pragmatists relative lack of regard for Violence Seekers.
11. **Message MOEs:**
	1. Questioning ideological and pragmatic goals/decisions
	2. Impulsive decision making
	3. Weakening loyalty to ISIL organization and other leader subgroups
	4. Low information sharing and decrease in exchange.

#### Providing Off-Ramps for Da’esh Leaders

Retaking Da’esh Territory is the first step in defeating them as an organization. However, there is a danger to think that it is the end of the battle. Moreover, many of the leaders of Da’esh have led other conflicts throughout their lives, in fact serving as mercenary leaders for violence of all types. Thus, the purpose of our final section is to offer some potential off-ramps for these leaders to influence them to desist from ideologically-motivated violence. To do this correctly, however, the nature of what motivates them must be taken into account. Thus, our longitudinal work profiling these leaders as detailed in the previous section is critical for providing tailored off-ramps or “Golden Bridges” to encourage them to desist from violence.

As described in the previous section and in other publications (e.g., Ligon et al., 2014), the three “types” of Da’esh leaders hold distinct positions, have unique decision making styles, and will be influenced by very different off-ramps. First, the *True Ideologues*, who have held positions of religious authority in Da’esh, make decisions based on historical lessons of what to avoid and what has been gleaned from the past. They view current battles as part of a long, historical battle between Islam and Crusaders, and they genuinely believe their religion is under attack. While their allegiance to the more pragmatic members of Da’esh (e.g., former Baathists, alliances among tribes, etc.) has been shaken in former months, they are highly trusting of others who they perceive to have religious piety and conviction to the cause. Off-ramps that may work should be delivered by credible messengers, or those with ideological mindsets (credentials are less meaningful with this group, as they believe in Takfir and are weary of those with formal ideological training; instead, focus on third party endorsements from meaningful networks to increase credibility of the messenger). These ideologues may be swayed by the *opportunity for recognition of the meaningfulness of the cause and their historical roles in it.* One option could be ensure that they help chronicle the movement, playing up that we need their input on the decisions they made along the way that inspired the one of the “most important Islamic Social Movements” of our time. This appeal for chronicling history is highly persuasive to ideologues, as they want to ensure what they did will be remembered and studied. Next, if these leaders have family, ensuring safe passage for their family members to a Sunni Country/Territory where they can be instrumental in overseeing the confinement conditions of captured fighters would also engender greater feelings of trust among the coalition and the families of the true ideologues. The least effective off-ramp for this group would be to send them to a traditional deradicalization program; as the leaders of Da’esh see their beliefs as central to their identity, trying to deradicalize them from these strongly held beliefs and values will be unsuccessful in this group. Instead, programmatic efforts should focus on desistance from violence and alternative mechanisms to affect social change.

Contrary to the ideologues, pragmatics often hold very technical or administrative positions. Their decision making is characterized by loyalties based on perceived instrumental use, and they can be persuaded with more rational, logical and interest based appeals. They also are influenced by explicit promise of reward (or reduction in punishment), and the administration of resources cannot be underemphasized with this group. Again, these leaders will be persuaded by the promise of safe passage for their families with visitation elements similar to those in witness protection programs. In addition, off-ramps should focus on leveraging their expertise for restoration planning for formerly occupied land (particularly because they were often leads at holding territory once gained by Da’esh), and collaborating with them to assist in the rebuilding of the formerly Da’esh-held territory. Many of these individuals have unique skills and talents that made them useful to Da’esh, and off-ramps that highlight these can yield greater commitment to desist from violence down the road.

Finally, the violence seekers often held positions of leadership where they meted severe punishment. For example, anyone involved with the atrocities against the Yazidis, in administrative positions in the Hisba where they were involved in administering “justice,” or anyone who can be connected to direct violence and atrocities above and beyond complicity or knowledge post hoc will meet these criteria. These individuals often traveled from other countries to join the fight, and rose in the ranks due to the extreme levels of brutality and violence in which they engaged. They have difficulty following authority, and they often have personality disorders such as extreme narcissism (and accompanying object beliefs), anti-social personality, and oppositional defiant disorder as classified by western diagnostic manuals. They may appear fervent in their conviction, but in reality, have superficial training and knowledge about Islam (many are recent converts). With these leaders, our view is that there are no suitable off-ramps; moreover, these individuals will not benefit from opportunities for desistance or rebuilding Iraq and Syria. Thus, it is our recommendation they be detained and allotted punishment commensurate with their home countries’ norms.

#### In summary

Da’esh as a paramilitary force is in withdrawal (if not defeat) and Da’esh as an organization is in decline; however, Da’esh as an idea persists. The US and our allies should continue to sew fear, uncertainty, and doubt within the ranks of the Violence Seekers who comprise a significant portion of the paramilitary force. This effort needs to focus on not only degrading their current capacity to resist but also using the Violence Seekers themselves as warnings to others not to affiliate. The US and our allies also needs to engage the Pragmatists within Da’esh’s TMT to end the conflict and bring about a better peace; this requires nuanced appeals and political compromise but the effort in necessary in order to split the Pragmatists away from the Ideologues. The Ideologues represent the most incorrigible of the Da’esh TMT and thus the most resistant to influence. Efforts must still be made to not only limit their ability to retain those under arms but also mobilize new adherents. As Machiavelli cautioned, the US must avoid making martyrs out of the Ideologues but instead delegitimize them. This entails using their former clerics, bureaucrats, and soldiers against them and those who may come next. Doing this requires a nuanced understanding of the organizational and individual psychology of Da’esh, it’s TMT, and it’s members. This paper summarizes years of work done to develop that understanding along with suggestions about how those research findings may be operationalized.

**Biographies**

**Hassan Abbas**



**Kurt Braddock**researches the effects of specific types of communication in the processes surrounding the use of terrorism. Specifically, Dr. Braddock’s work focuses on (a) how terrorist groups use different persuasive techniques to draw individuals to join their groups, and (b) how counter-terrorists can use similar techniques to get individuals to leave terrorist groups. He teaches a number of courses at Penn State, including CAS100B: Effective Speech, Communication in Groups, CAS553: Disaster Communication, CAS283: Communication and Information Technology, and HLS805: Terrorism, Violence, and Threats. His work has been published in a number of communication, psychology, and terrorism journals, including *Communication Monographs*, *Personality and Individual Differences*, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, and *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*.

**R. Kim Cragin** is a senior research fellow at the National Defense University. She recently left a position as senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Cragin focuses on terrorism-related issues. Cragin has conducted fieldwork in Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt, northwest China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, among others. Her RAND publications include Severing the Ties that Bind (2015), Disrupting Global Transit Hubs (2013) and Social Science for Counter-Terrorism (2010). Cragin also has published academic articles, including "Resisting Violent Extremism" in the reviewed journal Terrorism and Political Violence (2013), "al-Qa'ida Confronts Hamas" in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2009), and "The Early History of al-Qa'ida" in the Historical Journal (2008). Her book entitled Women as Terrorists: Mothers, Recruiters, and Martyrs was released by Praeger in 2009. Cragin has a master’s degree from the Sanford Institute of Public Policy at Duke University. She completed her Ph.D. at Cambridge University in the United Kingdom.

Gina Ligon received her Ph.D. in Industrial and Organizational Psychology and Minor in Quantitative Psychology from the University of Oklahoma. Prior to joining University of Nebraska Omaha, she was a full time faculty member at Villanova University in the Graduate Programs in Human Resource Development. She also worked as a Director of Performance Consulting at St. Louis-based Psychological Associates. Her research program focuses on the identification and development of high level talent; she has specific expertise in innovation and leadership, and has published over 60 peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters on these subjects. Organizational structures and leadership in non-normative organizations (e.g., violent ideological) are also of interest to her.

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**Sarah Canna** applies her open source analytic skills to regions of vital concern to US Combatant Commands, particularly the Middle East and South Asia. To help military planners understand the complex socio-cultural dynamics at play in evolving conflict situations, she developed a Virtual Think Tank (ViTTa) tool, which is designed to rapidly respond to emergent crises by pulsing NSI’s extensive subject matter expert (SME) network to provide deep, customized, multidisciplinary analysis for defense and industry clients. Prior to joining NSI, she completed her Master’s degree from Georgetown University in Technology and Security Studies. She holds a translation certificate in Spanish from American University and has been learning Dari for three years.

1. See the response to Virtual Think Tank 1 for the first part of this response or contact Sam Rhem at samuel.d.rhem.ctr@mail.mil. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Findings in this section draw on a forthcoming article in a special edition of the *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* on the topic of countering violent extremism, entitled, "The Challenge of Foreign Fighter Returnees.” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Findings in this section draw on three publications on the topic of non-radicalization, including the results from a forthcoming study on Yemen. References can be found in the Bibliography. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. This chapter is reproduced from an SMA-sponsored white paper called ***Options to Facilitate Socio-Political Stability in Syria and Iraq*** published in November 2016. It can be retrieved from <http://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/16.11-Options-to-Facilitate-Socio-Political-Stability-in-Syria-and-Iraq2....pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. For a detailed report of our longitudinal study of VEO leadership teams, please visit <http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/organizational-determinants-violence-and-performance> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Weiss and Hassan’s 2015 book described the role of the former Baathists as a significant operational advantage in early Iraq territory gains. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. M. Hansen’s (2009) work on barriers to collaboration informs how to foment organizational factions. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Spitaletta, J. (2013). Neuropsychological Operations: A Concept for Counter-Radicalization. In M. Reynolds & D. Lyle (Eds) (2013). *Topics for Operational Considerations: Insights from Neurobiology & Neuropsychology on Influence and Extremism—An Operational Perspective*. Washington, DC: Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Carton, A. M., & Cummings, J. N. (2012). A theory of subgroups in work teams. *Academy of Management Review*, 37: 441-470. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Influence mechanisms based on Yukl’s model (1990) of inspirational versus rational appeals. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman (1995). An integrative model of organizational trust. *Academy of Management Review, 20* (3), 709-734. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Please email gligon@unomaha.edu and dcderrick@unomaha.edu for more information on this effort. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Please email lkuznar@nsiteam.com and Jason.spitaletta@jhuapl.edu for more information on psychological profiling. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)